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Abstract
In climate change policy, adaptation tends to be viewed as being
as important as mitigation. In this article we present a simple yet gen-
eral argument for which mitigation must be preferred to adaptation.
The argument rests on the observation that mitigation is a public good
while adaptation is a private one. This implies that the more one disag-
gregates the units in a social welfare function, i.e. the more one teases
out the public good nature of mitigation, the lower is average income
and thus less money (per region, country or individual) is available for
adaptation and mitigation. We show that, while this reduces incen-
tives to invest in the private good adaptation, it increases incentives
to invest in the public good mitigation since even small contributions
of everyone can have significant impacts at the large. Conclusively,
private adaptation thus must be viewed as a significant loss to global
welfare. When taking this result to the data we find that a representa-
tive policy maker who relies on world-aggregated data would invest in
both adaptation and mitigation, just as the previous literature recom-
mends. However, a representative policy maker who relies on country-
level data, or data at further levels of disaggregation, would optimally
only invest in mitigation.
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1 Introduction
Adaptation is increasingly seen as an important contributor to climate
policy, if not one of the main potential ‘solutions’ to our climate change
problem (IPCC, 2014b). For example, the IPCC (Parry, 2007) notes
that “[e]ffective climate policy aimed at reducing the risks of climate
change to natural and human systems involves a portfolio of diverse
adaptation and mitigation actions (very high confidence).” One, nev-
ertheless, cannot but feel uneasy about this additional policy option
as adaptation is likely to lead to more emissions simply because it re-
duces the damages we will face from climate change. As a result, this
will give rise to a violation of many of the well-accepted definitions
of sustainable development that were developed during the past years,
especially strong sustainability (Neumayer, 2003) and approaches rely-
ing on capabilities (Sen, 1987). In the light of this the question raised
in this article is as follows: If our climate policy were to be moti-
vated by the first best, should adaptation be part of the policy mix
or not? Or, slightly differently, assume a politician who attends the
next Conference of Parties meeting comes to you and asks: Having the
choice between mitigation and adaptation, how should I lobby all of
the world’s leaders to split up their money between the two?
One of the reasons for which adaptation has seen increasing at-
tention on the policy agenda is that prominent research suggests that
both adaptation and mitigation should play a role in climate policy.
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This result comes out of a growing literature that studies optimal cli-
mate policies in a representative agent framework. The articles that
we are aware of and that have treated this question in an analytical
approach, in order of publication year, are Kane and Shogren (2000),
Lecocq and Shalizi (2007), Yohe and Strzepek (2007), De Zeeuw and
Zemel (2012), Bosello et al. (2013), Bre´chet et al. (2013), Ingham et al.
(2013), Tsur and Withagen (2013), van der Ploeg and de Zeeuw (2013),
and Zemel (2015).1 In this line of literature the discussion tends to cir-
culate around the conditions under which adaptation and mitigation
are substitutes or complements, and the optimal mix between adapta-
tion and mitigation. The integrated assessment literature (Hope, 2006;
De Bruin et al., 2009; Bosello et al., 2010) has verified these theoretical
models empirically and came to the conclusion that adaptation should
play a major role in climate policy. While this literature has elicited
certain conditions under which, for example, adaptation (or mitigation
alike) is optimally neglected (i.e. set to zero) in climate policy, this
result tends to stem from either specific functional forms, or depends
on the level of economic development of a country.
In addition to these studies, there are authors who suggest that
mitigation should be viewed as a public good while adaptation is a pri-
vate one. This literature tends to split the world into several regions
and looks more deeply at the inefficiencies that are introduced by this
1A review and deeper discussion of these models is available in Agrawala et al. (2011),
Bosello et al. (2010), Patt et al. (2010) and Konrad and Thum (2013).
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distinction. For example, Mendelsohn (2000) showed that private adap-
tation would be inefficiently low if joint adaptation would be possible
(e.g. in the case of dam construction). A similar result has been shown
in Ingham et al. (2013) and Buob and Stephan (2011), who find that
adaptation is higher while mitigation is lower in a non-cooperative game
compared to a cooperative one. Ebert and Welsch (2012) and Brechet
et al. (2014) also study the differences between non-cooperative and
cooperative results. Farnham and Kennedy (2014) show that reducing
mitigation while increasing adaptation imposes a negative externality
on other countries and thus adaptation can be welfare-reducing.
In this article we follow the second strand of literature by splitting
the world more realistically into many regions or players and assume
that mitigation is a public good while adaptation is a private one.
Though this distinction has been made in articles that assess climate
policy strategies, we will not focus on inefficiencies or particular game
structures. Instead, in Section 2 we show that it is the public good char-
acter of mitigation that, for a sufficiently disaggregated welfare func-
tion, fully favours mitigation over adaptation. The intuition for this is
that the more disaggregated the social welfare function the lower will
be average income, and consequently at higher levels of disaggregation
there will be less money available for private adaptation. In contrast,
the potential sum for the public good mitigation can be very large with
increasing levels of disaggregation, since small contributions of every-
one can have significant impacts through the public good character that
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mitigation has. Intuitively, this should favour the provision of the pub-
lic good mitigation over the private good adaptation. Hence, private
adaptation represents a significant loss to global welfare. In Section 3,
based on a numerical exercise calibrated to world data, we show that
a policy maker who relies on a welfare function that is disaggregated
at least at the country-level would optimally set adaptation equal to
zero, while mitigation should be positive. Instead, a policy maker who
evaluates welfare at a higher level of aggregation would invest in both
adaptation and mitigation. We then argue in Section 3.1 as to what
is the ‘right’ level of disaggregation when evaluating climate policies.
Section 4 concludes with further lessons.
2 A simple model
We present a simple yet sufficiently general model to answer the ques-
tion above. Assume there are n = 1, ..., N symmetric agents. They
obtain average wages W/N , which they may spend on abatement or
mitigation. Wages net of abatement and mitigation are reduced by
multiplicative damages which are a decreasing function of the mitiga-
tion effort Mi ≥ 0 and adaptation effort Ai ≥ 0, implying that net
income is given by Yi =
(
1 −D(∑N1 Mi, Ai))(W/N − Ai −Mi). Mit-
igation has a public good character (via e.g. emission reductions that
affect CO2), while adaptation is a private good (e.g. reinforcing one’s
home against storm damages). The agents have a concave utility func-
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tion that depends on the net income, with U(Yi), where the sum of
mitigation and adaptation efforts are constrained by net wages. We
impose the following set of very general assumptions.
Assumption 1 The utility function U : R+ → R is an increasing,
concave transformation of Y .
Assumption 2 The damage function takes the form D(
∑N
1 Mi, Ai) ∈
(0, 1), D′M < 0, D
′′
MM > 0, D
′
A < 0, D
′′
AA > 0, and limM→∞D
′
M = 0,
limA→∞D′A = 0, D
′′
AM > 0, in addition to limM→0D
′
M ≥ −∞ and
limA→0D′A > −∞
While the first conditions in Assumption 2 on the shape of the dam-
age function are natural, the last two limit conditions need some elabo-
ration. The subsequent result that we present rests on the assumption
that limA→0D′A > −∞, meaning that the impact of adaptation, when
adaptation is very low, is limited (Moser and Ekstrom, 2010). This
assumption is inspired by the fact that it is not enough to e.g. only
replace one tile on the roof with a strong, storm-resistant one, but in
order to have a safer house one needs to redo the whole roof. Or, sim-
ilarly, in order to prevent flooding it is not simply sufficient to use one
sandbag, but instead one has to surround one’s house with a flood bar-
rier that is high enough. Hence the idea is that adaptation should have
a certain threshold good character, or at least be not infinitely produc-
tive at the lowest margin. We also confirm that this is a reasonable
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assumption in our numerical exercise. Though this assumption is not
necessary for the central result, it facilities the subsequent reasoning.
We furthermore impose the following technical condition.
Assumption 3 W > −1−D(0,0)
D′M (0,0)
and W > −1−D(0,0)
D′A(0,0)
.
These two conditions in Assumption 3 imply that mitigation and adap-
tation are, at least to some extent, beneficial to curb the impact of
climate change and not too expensive. In other words, we assume that
there is a role for either mitigation or adaptation in climate policy.
Assume a benevolent policy maker maximizes the sum of these util-
ity functions across the population. Knowing that everyone behaves
the same this policy maker maximizes
V = NU
(
(1−D(NM,A))(W/N − A−M)). (1)
Then it is clear that the maximum is achieved when
−D′A(NM,A)
(
W/N − A−M) ≤ 1−D(NM,A), (2)
−D′M(NM,A)
(
W/N − A−M) ≤ 1−D(NM,A)
N
, (3)
where (2) holds with equality if A > 0, while (3) holds with equality
when M > 0. We summarize the first results in the following proposi-
tion.
Proposition 1 Under Assumptions 1 and 2 the maximization problem
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(1) yields
1. a corner solution in both adaptation A = 0 and mitigation M = 0
if
W
N
< −1−D(0, 0)
D′A(0, 0)
, (4)
and
W < −1−D(0, 0)
D′M(0, 0)
. (5)
2. a corner solution in adaptation A = 0 alone if, for an optimum
interior M∗,
M∗ >
W
N
+
1−D(NM∗, 0)
D′A(NM∗, 0)
, (6)
and
M∗ =
1
N
(
W +
1−D(NM∗, 0)
D′M(NM∗, 0)
)
(7)
which jointly requires
D′M(NM, 0)N < D
′
A(NM, 0), (8)
3. and a corner solution in mitigation M = 0 alone if, for an opti-
mum interior A∗,
A∗ >
1
N
(
W +
1−D(0, A∗)
D′M(0, A∗)
)
, (9)
and
A∗ =
W
N
+
1−D(0, A∗)
D′A(0, A∗)
(10)
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which jointly requires
ND′M(0, A
∗) > D′A(0, A
∗). (11)
4. an interior solution in mitigation M > 0 and adaptation A > 0 if
W/N − A∗ −M∗ = −1−D(NM
∗, A∗)
D′A(NM∗, A∗)
= −1−D(NM
∗, A∗)
ND′M(NM∗, A∗)
,
(12)
which requires
ND′M(NM
∗, A∗) = D′A(NM
∗, A∗). (13)

Proof 1 Follows directly from perturbing equations (2) and (3) and
applying the Kuhn-Tucker conditions. 
We now show that the public good character of mitigation and the
private good character of adaptation play a crucial role for the optimal
mix between adaptation and mitigation. In particular, we shall not, as
is usual, focus on the demand side (properties of non-excludable and
non-rival) of public goods, but instead on the supply side. As sug-
gested above, the focus will be on the first-best, the social optimum,
and thus we also do not look at the free-rider problem or the externality-
induced inefficiencies of over/under-provision which are generally asso-
ciated with public goods. Instead, we look at the supply side in order
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to understand what makes a public good more ‘public’ relative to a
private good.
Imagine you are a policy maker and you maximize wealth subject
to adaptation and mitigation for the world as a whole (N = 1). In
this case, the public good mitigation would be indistinguishable from a
private good. In contrast, assume you maximize over the major regions
of the world (e.g. RICE-2010 model assumes N = 12). Then the fact
that the world income is now split over 12 regions matters for the
optimal choices. Take this now to the extreme and assume that 7.3
billion individuals are considered by the policy maker. Average income
will be very low in this case, and consequently there will only be a
limited budget available for private adaptation, while the potential sum
for the public good mitigation can be very large. Intuitively, this should
favour the provision of the public good mitigation over the private good
adaptation.
Let us see whether this intuition applies to the optimal mix between
the public good mitigation and the private good adaptation. Assume
we are in case 2, which corresponds to parameter conditions that yield
an interior solution in mitigation but a corner in adaptation. Then
from the optimal condition for M∗, equation (7), we get
dM∗
dN
= −M
∗
N
= − 1
N2
(
W +
1−D
D′M
)
< 0. (14)
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The left-hand side of inequality (6) decreases in N . In contrast, the
right-hand side of the inequality changes with N according to
d
(
W
N
+ 1−D(NM
∗,0)
D′A(NM∗,0)
)
dN
= −W
N2
.
Hence, the left-hand side of the inequality reduces more slowly than
the right-hand side if N increases. As a result, if case 2 applies for a
given N , then it will still hold for increasing N . This is also confirmed
for the joint condition (8) which, if it holds for a given N , also holds
for a larger N .
Assume now we are in case 3, thus M = 0 and A > 0 is optimal.
Then from the optimal A∗ derived in equation (10) we obtain
dA
dN
= − W
N2(2 + 1−D(0,A)
D′A(0,A)2D
′′
AA
)
< 0. (15)
In addition, from equation (10) we can find that the optimal A∗ = 0
for N ≥ − D′A(0,0)W
(1−D(0,0)) .
We, therefore, find that for increasing N it becomes increasingly
unlikely that case 3 holds. The condition for this is summarized in the
following proposition.
Proposition 2 A∗ = 0 if, for any optimal M , N ≥ −D′A(NM,0)W
1−D(NM,0) .
Proof 2 Based on equation (10), we re-write the condition from Propo-
11
sition 2 as
W
N
= A∗ − 1−D(0, A
∗)
D′A(0, A∗)
.
As A∗ − 1−D(0,A∗)
D′A(0,A∗)
is an increasing function of A and −1−D(0,0)
D′A(0,0)
> 0,
then this condition will not be satisfied if W/N < −1−D(0,0)
D′A(0,0)
. Also,
d
(
1−D(0,0)
D′A(0,0)
)
d(NM)
= −
(
D′′AMW
1−D +
D′AD
′
MW
1−D)2
)
< 0.
Re-writing yields the condition in the proposition above. 
Figure 1 shows the condition under which the maximization problem
yields a corner solution in adaptation and an interior solution in miti-
gation given that Assumption 3 holds.
Hence, for a sufficiently disaggregated welfare function we find that
mitigation should be favoured over adaptation. Furthermore, we con-
jecture that this result will continue to hold in the case of multiple pe-
riods and asymmetric agents, and it will be strengthened if we include
uncertainty, the risk of climate catastrophes, and e.g. the inability to
migrate to safer regions. In addition, this complements the results of
the Aggregation Dilemma (Schumacher, 2014), namely that a policy
maker should evaluate climate policy preferably at smaller levels of ag-
gregation since the averaging away of climate impacts at higher levels
of aggregation implies an underestimation of the social cost of carbon.
12
Figure 1: The corner solution for adaptation
The result above also suggests that both representative agent mod-
els, such as Kane and Shogren (2000), Lecocq and Shalizi (2007), Yohe
and Strzepek (2007), De Zeeuw and Zemel (2012), Bosello et al. (2013),
Bre´chet et al. (2013), Ingham et al. (2013), Tsur and Withagen (2013),
van der Ploeg and de Zeeuw (2013), Zemel (2015), or integrated as-
sessment models based on a global or regional split-up of the world,
such as Hope (2006), De Bruin et al. (2009) or Bosello et al. (2010),
will underestimate the optimal mitigation action and overestimate the
optimal adaptation effort since they do not, or only minimally, take
the public versus private good setting into account.
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3 Empirical considerations
We will now investigate inhowfar these theoretical results carry forward
to empirically relevant settings. To do so we build upon Golosov et al.
(2014) and define the damage function as follows.
Assumption 4 The damage function takes the form D(
∑N
1 Mi, Ai) =
1−exp
(
−γ(Ai)
(
S(W,
∑
iMi)−S¯
))
, where γ(Ai) denotes the damage
elasticity, while S(W,
∑
iMi)− S¯ is the difference between the current
atmospheric carbon level and the pre-industrial one.
Hassler et al. (forthcoming) show that this damage function is a useful
approximation relative to Nordhaus’ (Nordhaus, 2007) damage func-
tion. Golosov et al. (2014) assume the damage elasticity parameter
to be given exogenously, while we endogenize it through adaptation
expenditure γ(Ai).
An obvious question is as to how adaptation affects the damage elas-
ticity parameter and how mitigation precisely affects carbon emissions.
Clearly, there is an inherent lack of acceptable estimates concerning the
way adaptation and mitigation help to reduce damages from climate
change. Based on a survey in Tol et al. (1998), De Bruin et al. (2009)
estimate that the costs of adaptation increase exponentially with the
damages avoided. The functional form that we use henceforth and that
approximates this is given in Assumption 5 below.
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Similarly, it is known that mitigation at low carbon emissions is
reasonable cheap, while trying to mitigate all emissions is extremely
costly. As mitigation may take many forms of emission reductions, such
as investments in renewable energies like wind or solar, reforestation
projects or investments in less carbon-intensive products, we take the
empirical form given in Assumption 5.
Assumption 5 The damage elasticity is given by γ(Ai) =
γ
1+Ai
. The
atmospheric carbon level is given by S(W,
∑
iMi) = φ
W
1+
∑
iMi
+ 848.
Thus, both the damage elasticity and the atmospheric carbon level are
convex functions of their arguments. We also take it that mitigation
will not reduce the level of atmospheric carbon below the pre-industrial
level, which is not a necessary but convenient assumption. In the def-
inition of S(W,
∑
iMi) the value 848 is the current (2015) level of at-
mospheric carbon measured in Gigatons Carbon (GtC).
One may argue that higher levels of adaptation lead to lower net
income levels and thus less carbon is emitted. However, there are many
cases where adaptation actually increases emissions, e.g. via increased
use of air conditioning in order to compensate for rising temperatures.
Similarly, improving one’s housing structure requires the production of
more cement, of stronger tiles, of better isolated windows, all of which
adds to carbon emissions. We thus take the most reasonable case and
assume that producing a unit of adaptation expenditure has the same
impact on the atmospheric carbon stock as a unit of income.
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In the following we will take this static model and assume that a
benevolent policy maker looks ahead until 2050 when deciding upon
the optimal adaptation and mitigation policy. Instead of adding util-
ities over the different periods we take average IPCC climate, as well
as average World Bank population and income growth scenarios. We
then sum up over the income from 2015 to 2050, and allow the policy
maker to choose his climate policy statically. By doing so we will only
obtain the average per period adaptation and mitigation expenditure,
and ignore potential effects that are due to the curvature of the util-
ity function or discounting. While this may somewhat affect the level
of the optimal choices, this should not impact the qualitative results.
Furthermore quantitative differences should be small for the low dis-
count rates that are currently used in climate policy, and also for utility
functions with little curvature (e.g. the DICE model of Nordhaus uses
a logarithmic utility).
It is now required to calibrate the parameters γ and φ. The pa-
rameter γ is the damage elasticity. We use the RCP8.5 scenario of the
IPCC, which is an unmitigated scenario that predicts a level of atmo-
spheric carbon of 1,378 GtC in 2050. According to Figure SPM.5 from
the 2014 IPCC Synthesis Report (IPCC, 2014b), the associated warm-
ing will be around 2.5◦C. Damage estimates for this level of warming
vary to some degree. According to the IPCC (Field et al., 2014) and
the Stern review (Stern, 2007), losses from a 2◦C temperature increase
amount to between 0.2 to 2% of income, with losses being more likely
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at the higher end of the spectrum. Thus, a 2.5◦C warming is likely to
be closer to losses of 2%, if not higher. In a recent study, Burke et al.
(2015) estimate the aggregated world damages for 2.5◦C warming to be
10% of world GDP. Due to a lack of better estimates we place slightly
more weight on the estimates from the IPCC, and take it that a 2◦C
warming induces damages of 4% of world GDP. The pre-industrial level
of atmospheric carbon was around 590 GtC (in 1750). Assuming that
this level of carbon was such that mankind had fully adapted to the
climate conditions, then using this information to estimate γ we find
that the unabated and unmitigated baseline scenario of 1,378 GtC in
2050 yields 0.96 = 1− exp (−γ(1, 378−590)). Thus, this gives a value
of γ = 5.18× 10−5. Golosov et al. (2014) obtain a very similar damage
elasticity of γ = 5.3 × 10−5. Furthermore, our damage estimates con-
form very closely to those by Nordhaus (2007), whose estimates would
yield a damage of 3.5% at 1,378 GtC. However, our damage estimates
are more linear in temperature than Nordhaus (2007) and overestimate
the damages for low carbon concentrations but underestimate them for
high levels of carbon concentrations. Nevertheless, a more linear rela-
tionship makes our model more in line with the recent empirical results
of Burke et al. (2015).
The parameter φ is obtained as follows. The Gross World Product
(in PPP, 2011 dollars) was 107.5 trillion US $. Annual world car-
bon emissions are currently 10.35 GtC. Thus, the propensity to emit
from world income is φ = 10.35/107.5. Since, according to the IPCC
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(2014a), roughly 50% of the emitted carbon leaves the atmosphere dur-
ing the course of a couple of years, we multiply this by 0.8, which takes
into account that more carbon is emitted closer to 2050 implying that
less could have left the atmosphere. We set the expected world growth
rate until 2050 to 3%, which is slightly lower than the recent 3.4% noted
in the IMF’s World Economic Outlook but includes the potential for
growth convergence. Given that the pre-industrial carbon level was 590
GtC in 1790 and that the current level of carbon in the atmosphere
is 848 GtC, then this yields2 a maximum carbon level of 1,372 GtC
in 2050, which corresponds very closely to the 1,378 GtC obtained via
the RCP8.5 scenario of the IPCC. Thus, it seems this simple model ap-
proximates the more complicated integrated assessment models rather
well.
We then numerically maximize the welfare function under different
assumptions on how the policy maker aggregates the social welfare
function: We assume (s)he may maximize the welfare function treating
the world as a) a single entity (the world); b) split up in 12 regions (e.g.
as in the RICE model); c) split up in its 193 countries; d) split up into
8 billion people3. The results are depicted in Table 1. We observe that
if the policy maker takes a country-level perspective, then the optimal
adaptation expenditure tends to zero. In fact, given the calibration
2The calculation is as follows: 848GtC + 0.8 × 10.35GtC/107.5$ × ∑3t=0 5(1 +
0.03)t107.5$ = 1, 372 GtC.
3There are currently 7.3 billion people on this planet. According to the World Bank, the
world population may (intermediate scenario) approach 8.6 billion by 2050. An average
over the period 2015-2050 is roughly 8 billion.
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Table 1: Numerical results
Split-up Adaptation Mitigation Total mitigation
World 10.71 2.967 2.967
RICE regions (12) 2.085 0.56 6.715
Countries (193) 0 0.065 12.484
Individuals (8 bill.) 0 1.56× 10−9 12.484
above, adaptation will be equal to zero for a social welfare function
that consists of a disaggregation level of 110 or more agents/regions.
The results presented here confirm that it is important to fully take
the public good nature of mitigation into account when deciding upon
the optimal mix with the private good adaptation.
3.1 What is the ‘right’ N to consider?
It is not entirely clear as to what is the ‘right’ level at which the wel-
fare function should be evaluated. The important question, therefore,
is at which level decisions are taken. Clearly, aggregation helps us
to simplify exposition and it also aids us in the understanding of re-
sults, it helps us in the modelling and very often it is easier to predict
the evolution of the whole than the evolution of its parts. Further-
more, data availability at the individual level is scarce and incomplete.
Consequently, higher levels of aggregation tend to be preferred, which
also explains the lack of country-level integrated assessment models.
However, ever since COP20, and especially in the light of COP21, a
global unified regulatory scheme seems far from achievable, and Na-
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tionally Appropriate Mitigation Actions re-introduce the country-level
perspective back into climate policy making. This thus implies that a
policy maker should set N at the country-level.
At the same time, most adaptation efforts are undertaken at the
household (e.g. house protection against storms) or city (e.g. dam
construction) level. For example, farmers protect their soils from de-
sertification by building appropriate water reservoirs. Families invest
heavily into fortifying their houses against storm damage. Migrants
pay large sums of money to migrate to places that are less susceptible
to climate change. These actions tend to see very little governmental
support but they nevertheless make the brunt of adaptation efforts.
Clearly, this is also unlikely to change in the future. As a result, a pol-
icy maker should optimally choose adaptation efforts at the household
level. This thus implies that N should be considered to be sufficiently
large for the result above to hold for most functional forms of damages.
What one should take away is that optimal climate policy should
thus be at least taken with the country-level perspective in mind. In
this case the numerical results have shown that adaptation should be
set equal to zero and mitigation should be set at a positive level. Again,
this is a direct implication of the fact that, while adaptation is a pri-
vate good, mitigation is a public good and thus small contributions of
everyone can have significant impacts at the large. If everyone were
to act unilaterally and spend money on individual adaptation then a
20
policy maker would evaluate this as a loss of welfare.
4 Conclusion
If we take the view of a benevolent world policy maker, then the result
presented above suggests that, considering a sufficiently disaggregated
welfare function (e.g. at the country level), the optimal adaptation
effort will be zero, while mitigation effort should be positive. Conclu-
sively, from a global perspective, the public good character of miti-
gation, by and large, indeed should favour mitigation action over the
private good adaptation. From a global perspective, private adaptation
thus represents a significant loss of welfare.
Based on a numerical exercise calibrated to real-world data we show
that a policy maker who evaluates social welfare at the country-level
(or higher levels of disaggregation) would not invest in adaptation, but
instead would fully focus on mitigation. Furthermore, if adaptation is
similar to a threshold good (i.e. take the case of a dam), then this
strengthens the point raised in this article. Additional factors that
strengthen the above result include uncertainty, the risk of climate
catastrophes, the inability to migrate to safer regions, or the inability
of the agricultural sector to adapt to certain climatic changes. The re-
sults presented here complement those from the Aggregation Dilemma
(Schumacher, 2014), which states that the social cost of carbon in-
creases the more disaggregated the welfare function is since aggregation
21
averages (important) differences away.
Of course we all know that the world is not ruled by a benevolent
planner. Does this imply this result has no meaning? Certainly not,
since it simply states that, if we want to achieve the absolute optimum,
then we should focus our maximum efforts on mitigation. It is thus a
negative result on the position that adaptation necessarily has to play
a role in our climate policy mix. Instead, it means that if our world
leaders are unable to cooperate to a sufficient degree and we cannot
achieve the best outcome for everyone, only then may adaptation play
a role.
Thus, the point raised here suggests that policy makers should get
their priorities straight: It is simply not true that “[e]ffective climate
policy aimed at reducing the risks of climate change to natural and
human systems involves a portfolio of diverse adaptation and mitiga-
tion actions.” (Parry, 2007) Instead, considering the result presented
here, the IPCC should write that “[e]ffective climate policy aimed at
reducing the risks of climate change to natural and human systems
must primarily consist of mitigation actions.”
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